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I.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps the largest American criminal justice system is that of
the United States military.' With more than two million soldiers,
sailors and airmen', the military criminal justice system is comparable to that of a medium size state.3 Moreover, draft registration4
and the power to institute a draft create the possibility for an infinite expansion of jurisdiction by military courts.5 In a time of increased mobilization, the military system would indeed handle
more cases than the federal government or any single state.6
Yet the size of the military criminal justice system can not be
measured by the number of uniformed members7 alone. Since a
criminal system is designed more for the protection of the innocent
rather than punishment of the guilty, the scope of the military sys*

Attorney, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Corp, HQ, 101st Airborne Divi-

sion (Air Assault) Ft. Campbell, Kentucky; B.S. (Psychology), 1983, University of Florida; J.D., 1986, University of Florida. The views expressed here are those of the author
and not necessarily those of the U.S. Army.
1. Karlen & Pepper, The Scope of MilitaryJustice, 43 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE Scl. 285 (1952); see also J Munster & M. Larkin, Military Evidence (2d ed.
1978) (In the preface to both the first and second editions, the authors note the continuing validity of this point.).
2. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, No. 560 at 341 (105th ed. 1985) [herein-

after cited as Bureau of the Census]; see also ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES
ARMY, PEACE AN ENDANGERED SPECIES? A YEAR END ASSESSMENT (1986)

(This

pamphlet, published by a non-profit organization, gives data on all the world's armies.).
3. Compare BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 2, No. 560 with Bureau of the
Census, supra note 2, No. 11.
4. 50 U.S.C. app. § 451, et. seq. (1981).
5. Military courts have personal jurisdiction over all active duty personnel, cadets
and midshipmen, reservists during training periods, retired members receiving hospitalization from the military or who are entitled to pay, members of the Fleet Reserve or
Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, persons serving a sentence imposed by a military court,
POW's, civilians serving with or accompanying an armed force in time of war. Uniform
Code of Military Justice [hereinafter UCMJ] art. 2, 10 U.S.C. § 802 (1956).
6. See Karlen & Pepper, supra note 1, at 287. (The authors estimate that the military handled 30% of all American criminal cases during World War I.).
7. The term "uniformed members" refers to soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen/women in the armed forces.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:291

tern includes all persons protected by its laws and regulations. It is
important to note that there are military installations throughout
the United States and in several countries throughout the world.'
Crimes against civilian persons or property in these areas often
form the basis of military criminal jurisdiction.9 The scope of military justice, then, should be measured by the number of persons
subject to punishment, as well as the number of persons protected
by its rules. Viewed properly, the military criminal justice system is
potentially the largest in the nation.
Despite its apparent pervasiveness, military criminal law receives relatively little attention from the civilian legal profession.
Popular issues such as free speech on military installations and draft
laws traditionally receive a wealth of scholarly attention.'
The
more intra-military legal issues, which nevertheless affect a large
section of the population, are more often ignored. The military
mental nonresponsibility defense' 1 is certainly no exception. While
this is a uniquely important issue in any criminal system, it clearly
deserves careful scrutiny when applied in the military. In the military there is a greater chance that the demands placed on the individual will exceed his capabilities. A fair and carefully considered
8. THE GUIDE TO MILITARY INSTALLATIONS (D. Cragg ed. 1983).
9. Military criminal law prohibits all acts normally prohibited by state laws such as
murder or assault. See generally UCMJ art. 80-134, 10 U.S.C. § 880-934 (1956). The
identity of the victim and the location of the crime are generally not dispositive of the
military's subject matter jurisdiction over a particular offense. See Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971). If there is personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the
courts can punish for any enumerated crime whose commission has an adverse interest
on military discipline and effectiveness. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738
(1975). In United States v. Lockwood, the Court of Military Appeals indicated that a
crime committed by a soldier which has an adverse impact on the military's reputation
and morale may be punished by the military courts notwithstanding the victim's identity or the location of the crime. 15 M.J. 1, 9 (C.M.A. 1983).
10. See, e.g., Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen's ConstitutionalRights, 62 N.C.L. REV. 177 (1984).
11. The mental nonresponsibility defense is more popularly, and perhaps unfortunately, known as the "insanity defense." The term, "insanity," however, is misleading
because for most people it refers to raving maniacs. Thus a defendant may be mentally
ill to the extent that he should be excused, but if he does not fit the popular misconception, he may be unjustly convicted. "Use of the phrase 'mental nonresponsibility'
avoids distorted connotations and forces one to focus on the moral nature of the inquiry
into whether a person should be exculpated for his acts. A.B.A. Standing Committee
on Association Standards for Criminal Justice, PROPOSED CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL
HEALTH STANDARDS 316 (1984). Although the Manual for Courts-Martial uses the
phrase, "mental responsibility," Manual for Courts-Martial [hereinafter MCM], United
States R.C.M. 916(k) (1984), the term "insanity" still prevails among courts. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cortes Crespo, 13 M.J. 420 (C.M.A. 1982).
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mental nonresponsibility defense recognizes this as well as natural
limits on human behavior.
Due to the intense pressures of warfare, 12 and the more common stress related demands placed on the peacetime service member,13 the mental nonresponsibility defense should be more often
legitimately asserted in a military criminal trial. 4 Further, those
who place demands on service members have an obligation to ensure that the nonresponsibility defense is substantively and procedurally fair. This article analyzes the nonresponsibility defense,
beginning with the procedural aspects and later examining significant substantive issues and how they are resolved by the United
States Court of Military Appeals.1 5 The procedural section will discuss how the nonresponsibility issue is raised, the defendant's discovery obligations, the psychiatric evaluation and the appellate
procedures. The substantive issues discussed include the initial presumption of mental responsibility, the allocation of the burden of
proof, the evolution of the test of nonresponsibility, and the role
which mental health professionals play in the entire process. Fi12. Although most soldiers, sailors, and airmen, even in a traditional war, will probably never experience actual combat, those who do will go through things worse than
anything possible in a non-military setting. Usually only between the ages of 19 and 25,
they must cope with the fear of being killed or captured, the reality that death is a
common occurrence, and the unpleasant necessity of killing the enemy. In one case in
which the defense was asserted, for example, defendant was a POW during the Korean
War. United States v. Fleming, 17 C.M.A. 543, 23 C.M.R. 7 (1957). He was repeatedly
beaten, tortured, denied food and threatened with death marches. Id. at 550, 23 C.M.R.
at 14. When he refused to cooperate, the defendant's men were subjected to conditions
from which the defendant knew they could not survive. Id. at 552, 23 C.M.R. at 15.
The defendant was later court-martialed for giving in. Id. The case demonstrates that
even though the defendant was not "insane" within the popular meaning of the term,
the stress under which he was placed allowed him to legitimately assert the mental
nonresponsible defense.
13. Often separated from family, men and women in the military may feel lonely and
lack privacy at the same time. They are constantly moving from place to place with
little opportunity to establish "roots." "Military necessity makes demands on its personnel without counterpart in civilian life." Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300
(1983).
14. "We need only await the next war ... to see insanity as the most commonly
litigated issue in military justice." United States v. Kraus, 20 M.J. 741, 750 n.7
(N.M.C.M.R. 1985).
15. The Court of Military Appeals is the highest court within the military justice
system. UCMJ, art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1956). It has been referred to as the
"Supreme Court of the Military." Quinn, The United States Court of Military Appeals
and Individual Rights in the Military Service, 35 NOTRE DAME LAW 491, 494 (1960).
Directly below the Court of Military Appeals are intermediate appellate courts known
as Courts of Military Review. UCMJ art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1956). The Courts of
Military Review hear appeals from the military trial courts. Id.
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nally, the article addresses the current hostile attitude toward the
nonresponsibility defense. The article shows that hostility has existed for some time in the civilian community but is a recent phenomenon in the military. The proposal to adopt Michigan's
"Guilty But Mentally Ill" 6 system in the military is but one indication of this hostility. The article concludes by pointing out a continual need to monitor all aspects of the mental nonresponsibility
defense as it is applied in the military.
II. PROCEDURE
A.

Pretrial

The Manual for Courts-Martial, 17 provides extensive procedures relating to the mental nonresponsibility defense. If the defendant intends to rely on the defense, he must notify the
prosecution "before the beginning of trial on the merits."' 8 The
manual gives no specific time requirement' 9 nor has there been any
appellate decisions which have addressed the timeliness issue. Presumably the prosecution must have enough time to sufficiently prepare a rebuttal. Should the defendant fail to provide proper notice,
he may be precluded from introducing evidence in support of the
nonresponsibility defense.2 °
In addition to giving the prosecution an opportunity to prepare
a rebuttal, the notice may also serve as the basis for a psychiatric
evaluation. Any investigating officer, prosecutor, 2' defense counsel
16. See Trant, The American Military Insanity Defense: A Moral, Philosophical,and
Legal Dilemma, 99 MIL. L. REV. 1, 86-112 (1983).
17. The authority to regulate the armed services is vested to the Congress. U.S.
CONST. art. 1 § 8. By statute, the Congress allows the president to prescribe "pretrial,
trial and trial procedures, including modes of proof." UCMJ art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836
(1956). By executive order the president prescribes a procedural document known as
the Manual for Courts-Martial [hereinafter MCM]. Exec. Order No. 12473, (1984).
The Manual for Courts-Martial is divided into five parts: the preamble, the Rules for
Courts-Martial (R.C.M.), the Military Rules of Evidence (M.R.E.), the Punitive Articles and Nonjudicial Punishment. See generally MCM, United States (1984).
18. MCM, United States, 1984, R.C.M. 701(a)(5)(b)(2).
19. Id.
20. MCM, United States, 1984, R.C.M. 701(g)(3)(c). The Court of Military Appeals
consistently refers to the mental nonresponsibility defense as one which enjoys a "preferred status." See, e.g., United States v. Babbidge, 18 C.M.A. 327, 329, 40 C.M.R. 39,
41 (1969). Hence, it is unlikely that the defense would be precluded because of the
procedural error.
21. In the military, the prosecutor is traditionally referred to as the trial counsel.

19871

MILITARY MENTAL NONRESPONSIBILITY DEFENSE

or juror" having a doubt as to defendant's mental state may peti23
tion the court for an order granting a psychiatric evaluation.
Although defendant need not comply with the order, his failure to
do so allows the court to prevent defendant's introduction of expert
medical testimony on the issue of nonresponsibility.2 4 In some instances this may be one of the lesser sanctions for an uncooperative
defendant. Since the evaluation report may be the basis of an immediate dismissal of the charges, 25 a failure to comply could be
counterproductive.
The prosecution's right to subject a defendant to a psychiatric
evaluation or alternatively preclude his introduction of expert testimony has not always been apparent. This was mainly because of
the defendant's right to remain silent. 26 Even though there were
provisions mandating compliance in the early Manual for CourtsMartial, 27 defendants relied on this right to ignore an order to participate in a psychiatric evaluation. 28 In two cases during the mid
1950's29 the United States Court of Military Appeals refused to de-

cide whether precluding the introduction of expert defense witnesses as a sanction for noncompliance would violate defendant's
right to remain silent.3 0 Instead, the Court simply noted that the
issue was "veiled in uncertainty.

'3 1

It was not until 1969 in United States v. Babbidge32 that the
Court addressed the uncertainty. In that case the defendant was
charged with wrongful communication of threat by telephone3 3 and
he intended to rely on the nonresponsibility defense.34 On advice of
counsel, defendant refused to submit to a psychiatric evaluation requested by the prosecution.35 On motion, the trial court precluded
22. Jurors in the military are referred to as "court members" or "members."
UCMJ, arts. 51-52, 10 U.S.C. § 851-52 (1956).
23. MCM, United States, 1984, R.C.M. 706(a)(1984).
24. MCM, United Stated, 1984, M.R.E. 302(e).
25. MCM, United States, 1984, R.C.M. 706 (discussion).
26. See United States v. Bunting, 6 C.M.A. 170, 19 C.M.R. 296 (1955).
27. See, e.g., MCM, United States, 1969, para. 122.
28. Bunting, 6 C.M.A. 170, 176, 19 C.M.R. 296, 302 (1955).
29. United States v. Biesak, 3 C.M.A. 714, 14 C.M.R. 132 (1954); Bunting, 6
C.M.A. 170, 19 C.M.R. 296 (1955).

30. Id.
31. Bunting, 6 C.M.A. 170, 176, 19 C.M.R. 296, 302 (1955); Biesak, 3 C.M.A. 714,
723, 14 C.M.R. 132, 141 (1954).
32. 18 C.M.A. 327, 40 C.M.R. 39 (1969).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 18 C.M.A. at 329, 40 C.M.R. at 40.
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defense experts from testifying unless the defendant submitted to
the prosecution's psychiatric evaluation.3 6
In determining whether the lower court ruling was correct, the
Court of Appeals considered two competing interests. The first was
whether the defendant should be forced to compromise his right to
remain silent in order to avail himself of an otherwise available defense. 37 The second was whether fairness and the truth seeking pro38
cess of trial should be sacrificed for the sake of individual rights.
The Court surveyed earlier federal court opinions which held that a
defendant must submit to a prosecution requested evaluation if he is
to rely on the nonresponsibility defense.39 The Court noted that the
prosecution would normally not carry its burden if it had to rely on
"(1) testimony by lay persons, (2) cross examination of psychiatrists
testifying for the accused, and (3) testimony by military psychiatrists or physicians founded on courtroom observations, hypothetical questions or both."4 ° Thus, the Court held that a defendant
who raises the nonresponsibility defense impliedly waives his right
to silence and must submit to a prosecution requested psychiatric
evaluation. 4
The majority was careful to note that statements made during
the prosecution requested evaluation could not be revealed.4 2 At
trial only the clinical diagnosis and ultimate conclusion, i.e. "mentally responsible" or "nonresponsible" was allowed.4 3 However, the
dissent in Babbidge was correct in predicting that the Court's holding would lead to further erosion of the right to remain silent. 44 For
example, in United States v. White, 45 the defendant used the nonresponsibility defense against a murder charge. 46 As part of his defense, the defendant asserted an inability to clearly remember the
36. Id.
37. 18 C.M.A. at 331,40 C.M.R. at 43 quoting State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d

770 (1965).
38. 18 C.M.A. at 331, 40 C.M.R. at 43.
39. Alexander v. United States, 380 F.2d 33, 39 (8th Cir. 1967) ("It would violate
judicial common sense to permit a defendant to invoke the defense of insanity and foreclose the Government from the benefit of a mental examination to meet this issue.");

United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968).
40. 18 C.M.A. at 332, 40 C.M.R. at 44.
41. Id.
42. Id.

43. Id.
44. 18 C.M.A. at 333, 40 C.M.R. at 45 (Ferguson, J.,
dissenting).
45. 19 C.M.A. 338, 41 C.M.R. at 338 (1970).
46. Id.
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fatal shooting.4 7 The prosecution's expert, however, relied on statements made during an ordered evaluation to rebut the claim of
memory loss. 4 8 In reversing the conviction, the Court thereby reaffirmed the general rule that prosecution experts may only give their
clinical diagnosis and state whether they believe the defendant was
mentally responsible at the time of the offense.4 9
The significant aspect of White, however, was the exception
that it established. The Court found the statements inadmissable
because the proper Miranda warnings 5° were not given prior to the
evaluation. Thus, if those warnings had been provided, the Court
would have allowed the statements for purposes of contradiction.
This exception can be quite dangerous because it is easy to confuse
contradiction with rebuttal. Contradiction is proving that a previous statement is untrue. 51 Rebuttal, however, may simply consist of
introducing a contrary opinion. 2 The Court in White should have
made clear that if proper warnings were given, statements made
during the evaluation could be used to contradict, but not for the
more general purpose of supporting a contrary expert opinion.
Otherwise, the seemingly limited exception established in White
could swallow the rule.
The protective nature of the rule against the use of incriminatory statements made during a prosecution requested evaluation
was essentially destroyed in United States v. Parker." In that case,
the Court admitted patently incriminating statements for the pur47. 19 C.M.A. 339, 41 C.M.R. at 339.
48. 19 C.M.A. at 340, 41 C.M.R. at 340.
49. Id.
50. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); United States v. Tempia, 16
C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967); UCMJ art. 31, 10 U.S.C. 831 (1956). Before any
examination is undertaken, the defendant must be told of the nature of the offense he is

accused of, that he may remain silent, that the psychiatrist(s) may be called to testify,
that he has the right to have an attorney present and that he may stop talking at any
time. United States v. Parker, 15 M.J. 146, 152 n.12 (C.M.A. 1983). See also DEP'T OF
ARMY, TECHNICAL MANUAL No. 8-240, PSYCHIATRY IN MILITARY LAW. One com-

mentator familiar with military psychiatrists notes that many psychiatrists are uncomfortable with this and simply ignore the requirement. Maron, PsychiatricExaminations
and Article 31: A Solution to the Defense Dilemma, 10 The Advocate 177, 179 n.1
(1978).
51. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 295 (5th ed. 1979).
52. Id. at 1139.
53. 15 M.J. 146 (C.M.A. 1983).
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pose of probing a defense expert's opinion. 4 All of the statements
described the actual killing at issue in the case." The admission of
those statements and the Court's rationale completely undermined
defendant's right to silence despite the fact that they were used to
test credibility.
In justification, the ParkerCourt listed four reasons for admitting the statements. First, the defendant was given a proper warning of his right to remain silent.56 Second, the statements were
elicited not to prove guilt, but to test the defense expert's credibility.57 Third, any incriminating effect which occured was thought to
be merely cumulative. 8 Finally, the trial judge gave adequate and
repeated limiting instructions.5 9
If these factors are to serve as a test for future cases, there will
be little protection of the right to remain free from self-incrimination. That these factors will always exist is evidence of this. The
psychiatric board is always required to give the warning so the first
element will invariably be present.6" Likewise, it is standard practice for a prosecutor to test the credibility of defense witnesses;
hence, the second element will always be present. Since the mental
nonresponsibility defense is most often similar to an affirmative defense, all evidence of defendant's commission of the crime will be
cumulative. This is, the actual commission of the crime is implicitly
admitted while defendant's mental state is litigated. 6 Thus, there is
54.
Q:
down
A:
Q:

On cross examination of the expert witness, the following discussion occurred:
Didn't the accused tell you that he shot Drury because Drury would not get
on his knees and beg him not to?
That was the approximate cause. The immediate cause.
What did the accused tell you that he told Drury prior to shooting him? What

were his words?
A: Something like, "Get down on your knees, or I'm going to shoot you." Something to that effect.
Q: And then Drury-

A:

"Get down and beg." Something along those lines.

Q:

And when Drury didn't do that, he then shot him?

A: That's correct. Id. at 151.
55. See Id.
56. Id. at 152-53.
57. Id. at 153.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See supra note 50. Note, however, that some psychiatrists ignore this requirement. Id.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Holley, 17 M.J. 361, 371 (C.M.A. 1984) ("Defense
counsel made it quite clear on several occasions that the only issue in' this trial was
appellant's mental responsibility at the time of the offense."); United States v. Jenson,
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a very good chance that the third requirement will also be present in
most cases. Since limiting instructions will be normally granted all
four requirements will exist.62 Therefore, the rule, and not the exception, is that statements elicited during a prosecution compelled
psychiatric evaluation will be admitted.
The Court of Military Appeal's initial holding requiring defendant to submit to a prosecution requested psychiatric evaluation
struck the proper balance between fundamental fairness and the

protection of individual rights. However, its lack of foresight in
carving out exceptions against the in-court use of defendant's specific statements has effectively deprived defendant of his or her right
against self incrimination. The price of asserting the nonresponsi-

bility defense is indeed heavy, and it is more likely that the present
rule will discourage many defendants from relying on the defense.6 3
Nevertheless, there will still be those defendants who take their
chances and submit to the evaluation.
The actual psychiatric evaluation is required to be conducted
14 C.M.A. 353, 354, 35 C.M.R. 133, 134 (1976) ("The defense tacitly conceded to the
[commission of the criminal acts] but urged the court-martial to acquit accused upon
the basis of lack of mental responsibility.") "Defenses includes any special defenses
which, although not denying that the accused committed the objective acts constituting
the offense charged, denies, wholly or partially criminal responsibility for those acts.
MCM, United States, 1984, R.C.M. 916(a).
62. In United States v. Holley, the Court of Military Appeals allowed similarly incriminating statements in as evidence even though no limiting instructions were given.
17 M.J. 368, 371 (C.M.A 1984).
63. Military defense lawyers have noted that because of the admissability of statements made during a psychiatric evaluation, "the defense of insanity is often considered,
[but] rarely raised." Maron, supra note 50, at 177. The Manual for Courts-Martial
provides the following rule:
(a) General rule-The accused has a privilege to prevent any statement
made by the accused at mental examination ordered under R.C.M. 706 and
any derivative evidence obtained through use of such a statement from being
received into evidence against the accused on the issue of guilt or innocence or
during sentence proceedings. This privilege may be claimed by the accused
notwithstanding the fact that the accused may have been warned of rights
provided by M.R.E. 305 at the examination.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) There is no privilege under this rule when accused first introduces into
evidence such statements or derivative evidence.
(2) An expert witness for the prosecution may testify as to the reasons for
the expert's conclusions and the reasons therefore as to the mental state of the
accused if expert testimony offered by the defense as to the mental condition of
the accused has been received in evidence, but such testimony may not extend
to statements of the accused except as provided in (1).
Notice that this privilege only applies to statements offered on the issue of guilt or
innocence and therefore Parkeris not conflicting.
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by a board of physicians.6 4 Although the Manual for CourtsMartial requires at least one psychiatrist, 65 the person seeking the
evaluation may request that the board be comprised of a greater
number of psychiatrists. 66 The psychiatric board may, in its discretion, conduct a very broad and far reaching examination. It may
consider administering a battery of psychological tests, 67 to include
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale,68 the Minnesota Multiple
Personality Inventory,69 the Rorschach Ink-Blot Test,7" the Thematic Apperception Test 7 ' and the Bender Gestalt Test. 72 An electroencephalogram 73 and an analysis of the defendant's body fluids
may also be administered. 74 Additionally, the board may investigate the defendant's medical, family, educational, sexual and marital history as well as any prior arrests and instances of drug abuse.75

During the interview with the defendant, the board may inquire
into the defendant's account of the crime charge, his adjustment to
military life, and his attitude towards being separated from home.76
64. MCM, United States, 1984, R.C.M. 706(c)(1).
65. Id.
66. DEP'T. OF ARMY, PAMPHLET [hereinafter DA PAM] No. 27-10, MILITARY
JUSTICE HANDBOOK FOR THE TRIAL COUNSEL AND THE DEFENSE COUNSEL at

3-60

(1982).
67. Id.
68. A psychological test, consisting of verbal and performance elements and used to
measure adult intelligence. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (25th
ed. 1974).
69. A psychological test consisting of 550 true-false questions designed to determine
a person's personality. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1425 (5th ed. 1982).
70. "A projective test which is sensitive to disorders of thought and emotion. It
consists of a series of 10 ink blot designs, some black and some in colors. The patient is
directed to look at the cards and tell what he sees. He is then asked to indicate what
aspect of the blot and which location suggests the percept he reports." DORLAND'S
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (25th ed. 1974).
71. "A projective psychological test in which the subject is asked to tell a story about
standard ambiguous pictures depicting life-situations to reveal his own attitudes and
feelings." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1429 (5th ed. 1982).
72. "A psychological test used by neurologists and clinical psychologists to measure
a person's ability to visually copy a set of geometric designs. It is useful for measuring
visuomotor coordination to detect brain damage." Id. at 450.
73. A recording of the brain's electronic signals used to detect lesions, brain tumors,
brain degeneration and epilepsy. J. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE E-31 (1982).
74. DA PAM No. 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE HANDBOOK FOR THE TRIAL COUNSEL AND THE DEFENSE COUNSEL at 3-60 (1982).
75.

DEP'T OF ARMY, TECHNICAL MANUAL No 8-240, PSYCHIATRY IN MILITARY

LAW at 4-3 (1968).
76.

DEP'T OF ARMY, TECHNICAL MANUAL No 8-240, PSYCHIATRY IN MILITARY

LAW at 4-4 (1968).
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The board uses all of this information to make its final determination as to mental responsibility.
The Manual for Courts-Martial presently requires the psychiatric evaluation board to answer the following questions:
(A) At the time of the alleged criminal conduct, did the accused have a severe mental disease or defect? (The term
"severe mental disease or defect" does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct, or minor disorders such. as
nonpsychotic behavior disorders and personality defects).
(B) What is the clinical psychiatric diagnosis?
(C) Was the accused, at the time of the alleged criminal conduct and as a result of such severe mental disease or defect,
unable to understand the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his or her conduct?77
The last question above provides the basis of the most vociferous debates concerning the mental nonresponsibility defense. The
two sides, lawyers and psychiatrists, agree, though, that too much
reliance is placed on psychiatric opinion.7 8 Both agree that there
are no objective facts which can be used to define who should be
excused for criminal conduct.7 9 Both also agree that there is a gen77. MCM, United States, 1984 R.C.M. 706(c)(2) (as amended by Ex. Order No.
12586, 52 Fed. Reg. 7103 (1987)). Prior to the most recent amendments, see infra note
220, the questions were:
(A) At the time of the alleged criminal conduct did the accused have a
mental disease or defect? (The term "mental disease or defect" does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.)
(B) What is the clinical diagnosis?
(C) Did the accused, at the time of the alleged criminal conduct and as a
result of such mental disease or defect, lack substantial capacity to appreciate
the criminality of the accused's conduct?
(D) Did the accused, at the time of alleged criminal conduct and as a result
of such mental disease lack substantial capacity to conform the accused's conduct to the requirements of the law?
The questions above were based on the test of nonresponsibility as established in
United States v. Frederick. See infra note 162.
78. A.B.A. Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice,
PROPOSED CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 363-66 [hereinafter

cited as A.B.A. Standing Committee]; American Psychiatric Association, STATEMENT
ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 13-14 (Dec. 1982) reprintedin A.B.A. Standing Commit-

tee, supra at 365; Bennett & Sullwood, Qualifying the Psychiatristas a Lay Witness: A
Reaction to the American PsychiatricAssociation Petition in Barefoot v. Estelle, 30 J.
Forensic Sci. 462 (1985) ("when the psychiatric expert attempts to apply the scientific
concepts of psychiatry to moral questions of law, the expert is implicitly functioning as
a layman, disguising lay opinion as psychiatric theory or terminology").
79. Diamond, ReasonableMedical Certainty, Diagnostic Thresholds and Definitions
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eral perception that psychiatric advice and testimony can provide
all the answers.8 0 When this perception proves false, each side
points the finger at the other for the system's failure to adequately
address the problem of mental responsbility. 8'
The central issue of debate revolves around the different focus
of the two disciplines. Arguably, the legal standard of nonresponsibility is an expression of relative truth. That is, whether a defendant should be excused for his criminal conduct does not depend on
scientific principles.8 2 Instead, the question depends on the moral
code prevalent at the time and place the question is asked.8 3 For
psychiatrists, however, "insanity" connotes an expression of, or at
least a search for, absolute truth.84
Since this standard of absolute truth is used by psychiatrists in
their advice and testimony, jury deception and confusion is inevitable."5 The jury will normally hear conflicting testimony from both
prosecution and defense experts. Moreover, both experts will be
testifying in terms of absolute truth. The jury, then, feels it must
guess between two absolute truths.86 When the jury feels constrained by the perceived infallibility of the two competing scientific
of Mental Illness in the Legal Context, 13 BULL. AM.

ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 121
(1985).
80. Bennett & Sullwood, supra note 77, at 464.
81. Compare Carroll, Insanity Defense Reform 114 MIL. L. REV. 183, 184 (1986)
("[John] Hinkley committed a terrible offense in full public view, [referring to the attempted assassination of the president], but by having the financial resources to summon extensive expert testimony, he obtained an acquittal.") with Wasyliw, Cavanaugh
and Rogers, Beyond The Scientific Limits of Expert Testimony, 13 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & LAW 147, 152 (1985) ("Public decisions are often so close to impossible
that those who are charged with making them are more than anxious to pass their
burden to unwitting experts . . . [t]he judicial system lumps the conflicts, needs and
fears of its terrible responsibility on psychiatry.").
82. See Bonnie, The Moral Basis of Insanity, 69 A.B.A. J. 194 (1983).
83. Id.
84. Professor Diamond notes that psychiatrists should seek to limit their testimony
to those instances when they can do so with "reasonably medical certainty," i.e. the
highest possible level of probability. Diamond, supra note 79, at 124.
85. In its amicus brief in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the American
Psychiatric Association stated " [ultimate issue testimony] permits the jury to avoid the
difficult acturial questions by seeking refuge in a medical diagnosis that provides a false
aura of certainty." American Psychiatric Association, Brief in the case of Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) quoted in, Bennett & Sullwood, supra note 78, at 463.
86.
Since the experts themselves are in disagreement about both the meaning of
the terms used to define the defendant's mental state and the effect of a particular state on the defendant's actions-but still allowed to state their opinion to
the jury on the ultimate question of the defendant's sanity-it is small wonder
that trials involving an insanity defense are arduous, expensive, and worst of
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opinions, its application of the moral nonresponsibility test will
often be incongruous with the prevalent moral code. Society's indignation is then inevitable and the debate over whether lawyers or
psychiatrists should be blamed arises.
Lawyers accuse psychiatrists of promising more than they can
deliver.87 They charge that courts have been deceived into believing
that expert testimony is highly reliable, when in fact it may be terri-

bly unreliable. 8 For example, some legal scholars define reliability
as "the probability or frequency of agreement when two or more
independent observers answer the same question." 89 They then
bring forth data to show that psychiatrists hardly ever agree and
therefore are inherently unreliable. 90 The ultimate conclusion is
that psychiatric advice and testimony should be viewed with a high

degree of skepticism.
This perception of unreliability was one reason why Congress
amended the Federal Rules of Evidence to prevent experts from giving an opinion on the ultimate issue of mental nonresponsibility. 9 1
The previous rule allowed the psychiatrist to testify even to the ultimate issue. 92 As noted earlier,93 the result was complete jury confusion because prosecution and defense experts were giving directly
contradictory opinions. The new rule was designed to better define
all, thoroughly confusing to the jury. Indeed the disagreement of the experts
is so basic that it makes rational deliberation by the jury virtually impossible.
S. Rep. 225, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 222, 223 reprintedin Carroll, supra note 81, at 190.
87. Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in
the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 752 (1974).
88. Reisner & Semmel, Abolishing the Insanity Defense: A Look at the Proposed
FederalCriminalCode Reform Act in Light of the Swedish Reform Act, 62 CAL. L. REV.
753, 775 (1974).
89. Ennis & Littwack, supra note 87, at 697.
90. In general, researchers have found that the level of reliability, as measured by
inter-psychiatric agreement on specific diagnostic categories is quite low, typically in the
neighborhood of 32 percent." Reisner & Semmel, supra note 88, at 775.
91. See FED. R. EvID. 704:

No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did
or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the
crime or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of
fact alone.
The military rule states:
Testimony in the form of opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact.
MCM, United States, 1984 M.R.E. 704.
92. Cf. MCM, United States, 1984, M.R.E. 704.
93. Supra note 85, and accompanying text.
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the role of the expert as a person with scientific data who only as94
sists the jury in making the ultimate determination.
Psychiatrists disagree with lawyers as to the reasons why the
need for change came about. Some insist that the judicial system is
using them as scapegoats for its own failures. 95 Most admit that
psychiatric advice and testimony has never been as exact as the
courts would prefer.9 6 However, they rightly note that the courts
have been willing participants in this deception.9 7 There is indeed
much credibility to the argument that the judicial system has been
all too willing to pass its burden of deciding mental responsibility to
the psychiatrists. The law, of course, has never been so exact that it
never makes mistakes. In the area of mental nonresponsibility, the
inexactness is highlighted. In its frustration, the legal system may
be over-reliant on psychiatry. 9s Thus, psychiatrists assert that it is
lawyers who are most responsible for failures of the system.
Another reason for the failure of expert testimony is the adversarial process.
The adversarial process itself comprises an additional societal
force toward overextension of expertise. On the one hand, the
ability to challenge and cross examine witnesses has always been
the main safeguard against excessive reliance on expert testimony
[footnote omitted]. On the other hand, the essence of the adversarial system is for two opposing sides to maximize, within the
rules of evidence, the data and testimony that support their case
and minimize that which conflicts. Clinicians who testify in
court thus find themselves in the position of desiring or being
pressured to exaggerate the content of their testimony and its certainty by courtroom questioning designed to advance a particular
side. 99
It is true that lawyers, in the zealous representation of a client, will
seek to maximize the certainty of expert testimony. To this extent,
they are as responsible as psychiatrists.
Still another area of conflict is the asserted inexactness of psy94. Carroll, supra note 81, at 190.
95.

PSYCHOLOGY AND

VERSY AND CHANGE

PSYCHIATRY

IN COURTS

AND

CORRECTIONS: CONTRO-

at 55 (Fersch, ed. 1980).

96. See Wasyliw, Cavanaugh & Rogers, Beyond the Scientific Limits of Expert Testimony, 13 AM. BULL. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 147 (1985).
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., MCM, United States, 1984, M.R.E. 704 which allows expert testimony
on the ultimate issue of responsibility.
99. Wasyliw, Cavanaugh & Rogers, supra note 96, at 152.
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chiatry. This implies that its helpfulness to the law is marginal at
best because the law deals with hard facts. Psychiatrists counter by
arguing that psychiatry is as exact as any other discipline."o That
those who call it inexact are simply ignorant of its precepts. 10 1
Whether psychiatry is inexact, however, is irrelevant. The focus
should more properly be on the legal system. The mental nonresponsibility defense, especially, is an inherently imprecise theory. It
is a moral question which can never be answered with any degree of
exactness. Therefore psychiatry should not be blamed for the lack
of a clear answer.
B.

Trial

The military rules relating to the actual litigation of the nonresponsibility defense have always been closely similar to those applicable in the federal courts.' 0 2 With the passage of the Military
Justice Amendments of 1986,101 the rules, like those in the federal
system, have undergone substantial change. In theory," ° the rules
were much more advantageous to defendant prior to the amendments. The defendant's mental responsibility was initially presumed.' 0 5 However, once the defendant introduced evidence
tending to rebut this presumption, 10 6 the prosecution had to prove
his mental responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt. 10 7 Hence, a
failure to prove mental responsibility was tantamount to a failure to
100. Clements & Ciccone, Ethics and Expert Witnesses: The Troubled Role of Psychiatristsin Court, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW, 127, 129-30 (1984).
101. Id.
102. The procedures of the military courts are, "so far as practicable," patterned
after those of the federal courts. UCMJ, art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1956).
103. Pub. L. No. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3905 (1986) (to be codified at UCMJ, art. 50a, 10

U.S.C. 850a).
104. Before the Military Justice Amendments, the rules required the prosecution
prove defendant's mental responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt. MCM, United
States, 1984 R.C.M. 916(K)(3) (discussion). It is arguable, though, that the Court of
Military Appeals was really placing the burden on defendant. See infra note 144, and
accompanying text.
105. MCM, United States, 1984 R.C.M. 916(K)(3) (discussion).
106. "Once some evidence of lack of mental responsibility is admitted, the presumption disappears." MCM, United States, 1984 916(K)(3) (discussion). The phrase
"some evidence" is not defined. In United States v. Biesak, however, announced a policy of liberalness, stating:
Indeed, the actions and demeanor of the accused, or an appropriate assertion
from a reliable source may serve as a proper basis for inquiry into this subject.
6 C.M.A. 714, 718, 14 C.M.R. 132, 134.
107. MCM, United States, 1984, R.C.M. 916(K)(3)(A) (discussion); United States v.
Burns, 2 C.M.A. 400, 14 C.M.R. 132 (1954).
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prove an essential element of the crime and the defendant was acquitted. These rules essentially placed the military defendant in the
same position as a defendant in a federal district court." 8
The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984109 radically changed
the procedure used in the federal courts. Since the military procedures closely follow those in the federal system, it was merely a
matter of time before military procedures would be similarly
changed. Eventually, the Military Justice Amendments of 1986'.1
changed the substantive test of nonresponsibility' 1' in addition to
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant and necessitating a
bifurcated voting procedure. 1 12 Thus, the military defendant has
lost his temporary advantage and is again on equal footing with the
federal defendant.
The new law places the burden on the defendant to convince a
majority of the jurors of his nonresponsibility by clear and convincing evidence.1 3 The prosecutor must still convince two-thirds of the
jurors that the defendant committed the crime,
and because the
prosecutor must still meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard,11 5 there is now a need for two separate jury votes. 1 6 The first
determines whether at least two-thirds of the jury find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'1 7 If not, the defendant is acquitted.118 If so, a second vote is taken to determine whether a simple
majority find a lack of mental responsibility by clear and convincing
evidence.11 9 If the answer is yes on this second vote, the correct
verdict is "not guilty only by reason of insanity."12 Otherwise, the
108. Prior to the Insanity Defense Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 20 (1984), the Federal
Courts were also requiring that the prosecution prove the defendant's mental responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Donney, 396 F. Supp. 511
(D.C. V.I., 1975).
For a list of every American jurisdiction's test of mental responsibility and burdens of
proof see T. BLAU, THE PSYCHOLOGIST As EXPERT WITNESS, 85 (1984).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 20 (1984).
110. Pub. L. No. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3905 (1986).
111. See infra note 222, and accompanying text.
112. MCM, United States, 1984, R.C.M. 921(c)(4); Williams, Not Guilty-Only by
Reason ofLack of MentalResponsibility, 169 THE ARMY LAWYER, 12, 14 (Jan. 1987).
113. Pub. L. No. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3905 (1986).
114. MCM, United States, 1984, R.C.M. 921(c)(2)(B); If the death penalty is imposed, all jurors must concur. MCM, United States, 1984, R.C.M. 921(d)(2)(A).
115. MCM, United States, 1984, R.C.M. 920(e)(5)(A).
116. MCM, United States, 1984, R.C.M. 921(c)(4).
117. Id.
118. MCM, United States, 1984, R.C.M. 921(d)(3).
119. MCM, United States, 1984, R.C.M. 921(c)(4).
120. Id. Although the new law does not explicitly call for a bifurcated voting proce-
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defendant is found guilty.

21

C. Appellate Review
If there is evidence that military criminal law gives a "preferred rating"' 2 2 to the mental nonresponsibility defense, it is supplied by the appellate procedures. For example, the defendant may
seek to have his conviction reversed by submitting evidence of nonresponsibility to the appellate court. This rule applies even though
the issue may not have been raised at trial.12 3 The appellate court
the evidence124
has independent fact finding authority to examine
25
required.1
is
trial
and determine whether a new
The appellate process is equally accommodating when the defendant has already been tried and was unsuccessful on the nonresponsibility defense. At the appellate level, he may supply new
evidence for the reviewing court. 126 Before the changes in the burden of proof,127 the appellate court would re-determine whether
there was a reasonable doubt as to defendant's mental responsibiliy. 128 Today, however, the court will probably re-determine
whether defendant's nonresponsiblity has been shown by clear and
convincing evidence.' 29 In any case, the appellate court has two
options. It may find, as a matter of law, that the standard of proof
has been met,130 or it may determine that in light of the new eviIn the first instance, the condence a different verdict is possible.'
viction is reversed and the charges are dismissed.'3 2 In the latter
instance, the court will order a new trial so that the additional evidure, the "not guilty only by reason of insanity" verdict necessitates this conclusion.
The word "only" signifies that defendant is being excused solely because of his mental
state and not because he did not commit the act charged. See Williams supra note 112,
at 14.
121. Pub. L. No. 99-661; 100 Stat. 3905 (1986).
122. See supra note 20. The Court of Military Appeals often uses the phrase "preferred rating" to justify giving the defendant broad procedural protections, especially in
the area of appellate rights. See, e.g., United States v. Triplett, 21 C.M.A. 497, 45
C.M.R. 271 (1972).
123. United States v. Bell, 6 C.M.A., 392, 20 C.M.R. 108 (1955).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 395, 20 C.M.R. at 112.
126. United States v. Triplett, 21 C.M.A. 497, 45 C.M.R. 271 (1972).
127. See supra note 110, and accompanying text.
128. Triplett, 21 C.M.A. 497, 45 C.M.R. 271 (1972).
129. See supra note 110, and accompanying text.
130. United States v. Covert, 6 C.M.A. 48, 55, 19 C.M.R. 174, 181 (1955).
131. United States v. Mulhern, 21 C.M.A. 507, 45 C.M.R. 281 (1972).
132. Triplett, 21 C.M.R. 497, 45 C.M.R. 271 (1972).
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dence can be considered.13 3 Of course, this rule is for the defendant's benefit only. If the jury determined the issue adversely to the
government at trial, the appellate court could not accept new prosecution evidence. 134 The "preferred" nature of the appellate process
is strictly for the defendant's benefit.
III.
A.

SUBSTANCE

The Presumption of Responsibility and the Burden of Proof

Since 1953, the prosecution has had the burden of proving the
135
defendant's mental responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt.
This rule was based on the United States Supreme Court's opinion
in Davis v. United States.'3 6 In Davis, the trial court instructed the
jury that the government had no duty to prove the defendant's sanity as part of its prosecution for murder, despite the fact that there
was evidence of mental nonresponsibility.' 37 In reversing the conviction, the Court stated:
How then upon principle or consistently with humanity can a
verdict of guilty by properly returned, if the jury entertains a
reasonable doubt as to the existence of a fact which is essential to
guilt, namely the capacity in law of the accused to commit the
crime. 138
With this firm sense of rightness, the Court required prosecutors to
prove mental responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt. 139 In Leland v. Oregon,"4 however, the Supreme Court proved unwilling to
impose its rule on the state courts. It ruled that Davis was simply
an exercise of its supervisory power over federal courts and not a
pronunciation of a constitutional doctrine. 4 ' By 1983, twentyseven states and the District of Columbia had taken advantage of
Leland and shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.' 4 2 The
133. Mulhern, 21 C.M.A. 507, 45 C.M.R. 281 (1972).
134. United States v. Carey, 11 C.M.A. 443, 29 C.M.R. 259 (1959).
135. United States v. Burns, 2 C.M.A. 400, 402, 9 C.M.R. 30, 32 (1953).

136. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
137. Id. at 476.

138. Id. at 488.
139. Id. at 493.
140. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
141. Id. at 797.
142. The states are: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii,

Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Washington and Wisconsin. Blau, supra note

108, at 85.
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military courts, however, continued to assert that prosecutors had
to prove mental responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt.143
Although the military courts were using the term "beyond a
reasonable doubt,"'" an analysis of early case law indicates that the
burden was clearly something less. For example, in United States v.
Biesak,'4 5 the defendant was on trial for desertion.' 4 6 He defended
on the basis of mental nonresponsibility.' 4 7 The trial judge instructed the jury that it could consider the "presumption of sanity"
in determining whether the prosecution had proven mental responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt.' 48 The defendant argued that
this was improper because to allow the presumption of sanity as
direct evidence even after it has been rebutted would be inconsistent
with the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.' 4 9 However, the
court reasoned that the presumption was based on a "rational
probability"' ° and therefore was enough "in and of itself"'' to
allow a conviction. In limiting its holding, the court noted that no
other element of the prosecution's case could be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt on the basis of a legal presumption alone.' 52
Biesak, therefore, was the first indication that the prosecution
did not really have to dispel every reasonable doubt about defendant's mental responsibility. Instead the prosecution might prove its
case without any real evidence at all. This apparently held true
even in the face of evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of
responsibility. That is, a jury could rely on the presumption of sanity to reject the defendant's defense of nonresponsibiliy. The Court
143. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 15 M.J. at 146, (C.M.A. 1983).
144. Reasonable doubt is that state of the case, which after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that
condition that they cannot say that feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge .... The evidence must establish the truth

of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty-a certainty that convinces and
directs the understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgement.
9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 2497 (Chadbourne ed. 1981) quoting Commonwealth v.

Webster, 59 Mass (5 Cush) 295 (1850).
145. See, e.g., Biesak, 3 C.M.A. 714, 14 C.M.R. 132 (1954).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 716, 14 C.M.R., at 136.
If, in light of all the evidence, including that supplied by the presumption of
sanity, the court [Jurors] has a reasonable doubt as to the mental responsibility of the accused at the time of the alleged offense, the court [Jury] must find
the accused not guilty of that offense.
149. Id. at 717, 14 C.M.R. at 137.
150. Id. at 719, 14 C.M.R. at 139.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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seemed aware that its holding in Biesak tended to lessen the beyond
a reasonable doubt standard, because it limited its holding to the
issue of nonresponsibility only. If it were not a significant lessening
of the prosecution's burden, the court could have applied the rule to
all other elements of the prosecution's case.
The broad implications of Biesak were not missed by the lower
courts. As a result, the Court of Military Appeals was compelled to
re-examine the Biesak holding. While the Biesak language seemed
to put the presumption of sanity on equal footing with other evidence, the Court's decision in United States v. Morris'53 indicated
that this interpretation was unintended. In Morris, the defendant
was charged with robbery, assault with a dangerous weapon, and
being absent without leave (AWOL).154 To support his mental nonresponsibility defense, the defendant called a Navy psychiatrist
whose extensive testimony indicated that the defendant was mentally nonresponsible at the time of the offenses. 155 Perhaps relying
on Biesak, the prosecution offered no impeaching or rebuttal evidence whatsoever.I5 6 In reversing the conviction, the Court of Military Appeals stated:
This is not to assert that expert psychiatric testimony must in
every case be rebutted or else this court should conclude that, as
a matter of law, the evidence of mental responsibility is insufficient. When, however, the record is devoid of any evidence permitting an inference of sanity, and reliable expert testimony is
permitted by the Government to stand unrebutted and
unimpeached, it is clear, that, as here a case exists in which reasonable men are not entitled arbitrarily to find the accused
57
sane. 1

The Viorris decision was a clear attempt to strike a balance
between requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt and allowing
the presumption of sanity as substantive evidence. The need for the
delicate balance arose because the Court had not held the prosecution to its stated burden of proof. The Court's language in Biesak
indicated this: "[It is] accepted doctrine that an accused must satisfy the jury of his insanity-which is to say that a rebuttal of the
153. 20 C.M.A. 446, 43 C.M.R. 286 (1970).
154. Id.

155. Id. at 448, 43 C.M.R. at 288.
156. Id. at 449, 43 C.M.R. at 289. Although there was no specific evidence that the
prosecutor was relying on Biesak, it is otherwise difficult to explain the failure to offer
any contradicting evidence whatsoever.
157. Id. at 451, 43 C.M.R. at 291.
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presumption of sanity demands more than mere evidence which
would induce a reasonable doubt of sanity." 1 1 8 This language
clearly indicated that a conviction could be obtained notwithstanding the existence of some evidence tending to induce a reasonable
doubt. The apparent result was a lessening of the amount of proof
needed to rebut evidence of nonresponsibility. If the Court had not
held as it did in Morris, there would have been no balance between
the presumption of responsibility and the government's burden of
proof.
In hindsight and from a social policy viewpoint, it was probably wiser that the Court did not require the prosecution to meet its
stated burden. Since the nonresponsibility defense involves a retroactive analysis of the defendant's inner thinking, there must always
be some doubt. I5 9 If every reasonable doubt had to be eliminated,
there would be very few convictions. This would ignore society's
right to protect itself from criminal acts not caused by mental
nonresponsibility.
The Military Justice Amendments of 1986160 is cited as a significant change in the burden of proof.16 1 Viewed in light of earlier
cases, however, the change is not substantially significant. The
Court never really required that every reasonable doubt be dispelled. Instead it established a compromise position. Thus, the
most significant aspect of the act is not the change in language, but
its vindication of the Court of Military Appeal's approach to the
presumption of responsibility and the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard.
B.

The Military Test of Mental Nonresponsibility

Prior to 1977,162 a military defendant was not mentally responsible for a criminal act:
unless he was, at the time, so far free from mental defect, disease
or derangement as to be able concerning the particular act
charged both to distinguish right from wrong and to adhere to
158.

3 C.M.A. 714, 723, 14 C.M.R. 132 (1954).

159. A.

GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE

19 (1967).

"[T]he moral nature of

the insanity defense makes any conclusion about the 'correctness' of a given insanity
verdict problematic." Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose
Time Should Not Have Come, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 494, 498 (1985).

160. Pub. L. No. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3905.
161. Williams, supra note 112, at 13.
162. In United States v. Frederick the court changed the substantive test of mental
nonresponsibility. 3 M.J. 230 (C.M.A. 1977).
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the right .... To constitute a lack of mental responsibility the

impairment must not only be the result of mental defect, disease
or derangement but must also completely deprive the accused of
his ability to distinguish right
from wrong or to adhere to the
1 63
right as to the act charged.
This test, based on the M'Naghten irresistable impulse rule,' 1 has
been the subject of unceasing criticisms. For example, because the
standard provided for no definition of the word "distinguish" there
was the danger that the fact-finder would consider the defendant
mentally responsible simply because he had a "superficial intellectual awareness" of right and wrong. 65 If this was the intent, then
the standard was so strict that there would almost never be a successful assertion of the defense. 166 The defendant who lacked even
67
the superficial knowledge would probably never even get to trial. 1
Another criticism was directed at whether the words "right
from wrong" referred to a legal wrong or a moral wrong. 168 That
is, whether the defendant was excused if, knowing the act to be legally wrong, he acted out of a mental illness-induced moral compulsion. The Court adopted the view that morality is irrelevant. 69 If
the defendant knew the act to be illegal, his defense would fail. In
bluntly rejecting the "moral" interpretation, the Court considered it
unjust to allow the defendant to "escape criminal responsibility be17
cause his personal moral code is not violated."' 1
The American Bar Association takes the opposite view. It
points out that if the defendant suffered a delusion that a supernatural being ordered him to commit the crime, he should not be held
responsible even though he knew the act was illegal. 7 ' This position puts the nonresponsibility defense at odds with the rest of criminal law because it makes the defendant's own moral code an issue
at trial. There is no other criminal defense based on the defendant's
personal moral code. Use of the "moral" interpretation does have
an advantage however. It alleviates the need to include the irresisti163. MCM, United States, para 120(b) (1951).
164. For a history of the M'Naghten-irresistibleimpulse rule see Trant, supra note
16, at 34-46; Cutts CriminalResponsibility: The New FederalRule v. Military Law, 13
JAG. L. REv. 202, 205-06, 208-11 (Summer, 1971).
165. A.B.A. Standing Committee, supra note 11, at 333.
166. See A. Goldstein, supra note 56, at 47.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 52-53.
169. Frederick, 3 M.J. 230, 238 (1977).
170. Id.
171. A.B.A. Standing Committee, supra note 11, at 333.
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ble impulse rule. For example, under the legal interpretation, one
who knew the act to be illegal would have to rely on the irresistible
impulse rule as his only defense. But under the "moral" approach,
one who knew the act to be illegal could argue that he placed his
moral code above the law only because of his mental defect or disease. Still, the moral approach is troublesome because it injects another subjective element into the test of nonresponsibility.
The safer approach may be to stay with the course taken by the
Court while continuing to excuse those who could not adhere to the
requirements of law. Under this approach, a defendant who acted
out of a "delusion from God," yet knowing the act to be illegal,
would not be excused because of his personal sense of morality. Instead, the excusability would result from an inability to adhere to
legal standards due to a mental disease or defect.
Another problem with the M'Naghten-irresistible impulse
based rule was the requirement that defendant be totally deprived of
his ability to distinguish between right and wrong or adhere to the
right. The Court of Military Appeals, consistently enforced this requirement. 172 However, psychiatrists realized that the total deprivation requirement was unrealistic. In one case, for example, a
psychiatrist testifying on whether the defendant was totally deprived of his will by a voice within his head stated:
How far that pushed him, how ineluctable, how inexorable that
push was I can't possibly quantitate. I can only describe it as, in
90% free
my opinion, a distinct force. I can't say that it left 17him
3
cant.
my
beyond
it's
free,
10%
him
left
it
or that
Hence, one of the most difficult problems was proving a defendent
to be completely deprived of his faculties.
The last major problem presented by the substantive test of
mental nonresponsibility was the articulation of the irresistible impulse rule. The trial courts usually gave the following jury
instructions:
If the accused would not have committed the acts if the circumstances were such that he could have expected immediate detection and certain apprehension, he cannot be said to have acted
172. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 4 C.M.A. 299, 15 C.M.R. 299 (1953) ("So
long as a person is able to adhere to the right he is not legally insane and a personality

which makes it difficult to adhere to the right does not legally excuse the commission of
a crime").
173. 20 C.M.A. 249, 253, 43 C.M.R. 89 (1971).
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under an inability to adhere to the right.1 74
These instructions were generally referred to as the "policeman-atthe elbow" test.' 75 It was based on the notion that if the defendant
would not have acted in the face of immediate apprehension, he was
not so deranged as to warrant excuse.' 76 The Court of Military Appeals was never quite comfortable with this articulation and more
than once was faced with dangers of its application. For example in
United States v. Covert' 77 the wife of an Air Force sergeant was on
trial for murdering her husband. 178 The prosecution experts agreed
that she was suffering from a mental disease, but did not agree that
she did not know right from wrong or that she acted under an irresistible impulse.' 7 9 They testified that the presence of any third
party would have taken the defendant out of the trance she was
under at the time of the murder.' ° They also agreed that it was
only the presence, and not the fear of apprehension that would have
prevented the crime.' 8 ' Nevertheless, the trial judge gave the "policeman-at-the-elbow" instruction and the jury returned a guilty
82

verdict. 1

The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction in Covert, noting
that the court below had applied the "policeman-at-the-elbow test
too literally.' 83 That test was simply a way of not excusing those
who would not commit crime if they knew that they would be punished.' 84 That is, those who could be deterred by the prospect of
punishment.' 8 5 The Court noted that even the prosecution's experts agreed that it wasn't the prospect of punishment that could
8 6
have prevented the crime, but the mere presence of a third party.'
In United States v. Jensen,1 7 the Court realized that the policeman test was just too narrow. Here again, the presence of any third
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See, e.g., United States v. Alpin, 15 C.M.A. 14, 15, 34 C.M.R. 460 (1964).
See United States v. Covert, 6 C.M.A. 48, 19 C.M.R. 174 (1955).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 53, 19 C.M.R. at 179.
Id. at 57, 19 C.M.R. at 183.
Id.
Id. at 56, 19 C.M.R. at 181.
Id. at 58, 19 C.M.R. at 183.
Id.
Id.
Id.
14 C.M.A. 353, 34 C.M.R. 133 (1963).
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party would have prevented the crime.188 Instead of attempting to
salvage some use for the policeman instructions, the Court disallowed its further use.189 The Court still recognized the irresistible
impulse test even though it too was increasingly under attack.' 90
Moreover, the Court agreed that the term "irresistible impulse" is
misleading because it conjures images of sudden, uncontrollable behavior and ignores mental illness characterized by long periods of
melancholia and brooding. 191 Indeed, the Court has indicated that

given the original choice, it would not recognize the irresistible impulse rule.19z Choosing not to completely disallow it, however, the
Court instead expressed skepticism as to whether the rule could re193
ally be successfully raised.
1 94
The American Bar Association, citing psychiatric consensus

makes a strong case for exclusion of the irresistible impulse rule.
The Bar argues that there is no way to objectively measure impulses 19 5 or to distinguish between those who "cannot and those
who will not conform to legal requirements."' 9 6 The ABA therefore asserts that the irresistible impulse rule is superfluous and offers
more chance for mistakes. 197 One scholar calls the irresistible
impulse rule "an invitation to semantic jousting, metaphysical speculation and intuitive moral judgments masked as factual determinations." 198 The conclusion is that the irresistible impulse rule should
be dropped.' 9 9
The attacks on the early mental nonresponsibility test led to
188. Id. at 354, 34 C.M.R. at 134.
189. Id. at 358, 34 C.M.R. at 138.
190. Id.
191. Id., see A. Goldstein supra note 153, at 70.
192. United States v. Trede, 2 C.M.A. 581, 10 C.M.R. 79 (1953) ("there are a good
many jurisdictions which have refused to recognize that mental condition [inability to
adhere to the right] as a defense to a crime. Were this a case of first impression we
might be inclined to follow those authorities").
193. Id. at 586, 10 C.M.R. at 84 ("since its legitimate applicability is extremely limited, the doctrine of irresistible impulse will seldom be invoked").
194. A.B.A. Standing Committee, supra note 11, at 331.
195. Id.
196. See Carroll, supra note 8, at 188.
197. A.B.A. Standing Committee, supra note 78, at 331.
198. See Carroll, supra note 8, at 188.
199. The A.B.A. does just that in its proposed test of mental nonresponsibility:
(a) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of such
conduct, and as a result of mental disease or defect, that person was unable to
appreciate the wrongfulness of such conduct.
This is very similar to the test adopted by the Military Justice Amendments. See infra
note 221, and accompanying texts.
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increasing demands for change.2 °° The first occurred in United
States v. Smith 20 1 where the defendant relied on the nonresponsibility defense to rebut a charge of murder.2 °2 On appeal of the conviction, the defendant argued that the Court should adopt the Durham
rule .2 3 The Durham rule exculpated defendant if his "unlawful act
was the product of mental disease or mental defect. ' '2° In rejecting
the argument, the court was most concerned with the broadness of
the Durham rule.20 5 It noted that the rule was so broad that it provided no guidance to the jury.20 6 It also asserted that uniform application of the law would be lost because each jury would apply a
different standard of causation.20 7 What would be the "product" of
mental disease or defect in one case might not be so in another.20 8
The defense argued that this was the case anyway; 20 9 that the jury
does not follow the law, but its own sense of sympathy. 210 Therefore, the defense continued, the law should abandon its efforts to
limit the jury.2 1 ' Of course, the Durham rule was just such an attempt. It made no effort to provide the jury with any moral guidance as the M'Naghten-irresistible impulse rule had sought to do.
Instead, Durham left the question entirely up to the jury. Had it
been adopted, the result would have been a kind of anarchy in the
courts with each case depending upon jury makeup. It was no surprise that the Court rejected the rule.212
The second major and more successful push for change came
in United States v. Frederick.2 13 In most respects, though, Frederick
was anticlimatic. The Court had already hammered out its answers
to the problems associated with the presumption of responsibility,
the burden of proof and the irresistible impulse rule. 214 The only
real problem not yet addressed was the "complete deprivation" re200. Cutts, CriminalResponsibility: The New FederalRule v. Military Law, 13 JAG.
L. REV., 202 (1971).
201. 5 C.M.A. 314, 17 C.M.R. (1954).
202. Id. at 320, 17 C.M.R. at 320.

203. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
204. Id. at 874-75.
205. 5 C.M.A. at 322, 17 C.M.R. at 322.

206. Id.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 323, 17 C.M.R. at 323.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 330, 17 C.M.R. at 330.
3 M.J. 230 (C.M.A. 1977).
See supra notes 163-211, and accompanying text.
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quirement. Even in Frederick, though, the Court did not sufficiently address the problem. The Court adopted the American Law
Institute test of mental responsibility which reads:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect the person
lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his or
or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements
her conduct
2 15
of law.
By substituting a "substantial" deprivation requirement for the
"complete" deprivation requirement, the Court adopted one term of
uncertainty in the place of another. Two commentators have set
forth the gist of the problem:
The word substantial implies that the capacity needed is somewhere between some capacity and total incapacity. If capacity
could be measured on a scale from 1 to 10, which it cannot,
would capacity be substantial at 5 or 6, or would a rating of 1 be
adequate? The term is vague, vexatious and highly subjective.2 16
Thus, the finder of fact is still asked to engaged in unnecessary speculation because of the perceived need to use some adjective to modify the term "capacity."
The most recent demands for change came about largely because of the perception that the American Law Institute test was
too broad.21 7 Some commentators suggested that any defendant
having the ability to hire enough experts could use the American
Law Institute to thwart the criminal process. 2 1' This viewpoint
quickly gained widespread acceptance after John Hinkley, Jr. was
found not guilty by reason of insanity for the attempted assassination of the President. 219 As one result, Congress passed the Military Justice Amendments of 1986.220 That Act provides:
It is an affirmative defense in a trial by court-martial that, at the
time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the
accused, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of
215. American Law Institute, Model Penal Code 401 (1962).
216. Corcoran & Lyons, The New Military StandardForInsanity: The Wild Beast
Revisited, 20 A.F.L. REv. 182, 186-87 (1978).
217. Carroll, Insanity Defense Reform, 114 MIL L. REV. 183, 185.
218. Id. at 184 ("Hinkley committed a terrible offense [attempted assassination of
the president] in full public view, but by having the financial resources to summon extensive expert psychiatric testimony, he obtained an acquittal.").
219. United States v. Hinkley, Crim. No. 81-306 (June 21, 1982); Carroll, supra note
217, at 184.
220. Pub. L. No. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3905 (1986).
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the acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a
defense. 22 '
The drafters apparently agreed with the critics of the irresistible impulse rule and decided to leave it out. 222 Another significant
change was the inclusion of the phrase "severe mental disease or
defect." This was included to lessen the number of persons who
could rely on the defense.22 3 It has already been suggested that the
new rule removes the mental nonresponsibility from its preferred
position in military law. 224 The last change is the adoption of the
"moral" interpretation rather than the "legal" approach. As a result, the defendant's knowledge of the act's illegality will no longer
be dispositive.
Given the relatively fast evolution of the substantive test of
mental responsibility, it is obvious that it is a highly scrutinized issue of criminal law. The law has moved almost in a circle. The
original test was thought to be too narrow. However, the subsequent change was thought to be too broad. The most recent change
is merely another adjustment made to a terribly inexact question.
Future changes will be a direct function of the performance of the
new test.
IV.

RECENT TRENDS

One of the most alarming trends involving the mental nonresponsibility defense is the high degree of hostility directed at those it
is intended to help. Some commentators suggest that mentally ill
offenders are really just criminals with the ability to hire experts
and thwart the criminal process. 225 The result of this hostility has
been a clamor for reform and, in some instances, the abolition of the
insanity defense.22 6
Further evidence of this attitude is the observation that the
mentally ill are being increasingly channeled into the criminal jus221. Id.
222. Williams, Not Guilty-Only by Reason of Lack of Mental Responsibility, 169
THE ARMY LAWYER 12, 13 (1987).

223. Id. at 13.
224. Id. at 12.
225. See supra note 218.
226. This demand for significant reform is not new. In the early 70's, the Nixon
Administration proposed far reaching changes to the mental nonresponsibility defense.
See Reisner & Semmel supra note 88. Even some psychiatrists and psychologists seek to
abolish the defense. E. Fersch, Psychology and Psychiatry in Courts and Corrections:
Controversy and Change at 111 (1980).
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tice system rather than the mental health system.22 7 For example,
one commentator noted that after a California hospital closed, there
was a 300% increase in the local jail population.228 Still further
evidence is supplied by scientific observations. In a controlled
study, a psychiatrist found that there was a significantly greater
likelihood for arrest if the suspect had a mental disorder.2 29 While
the evidence is still not conclusive, there is tentative evidence indicating a lack of tolerance toward mentally disordered offenders.23 °
This lack of tolerance is certainly spilling into the military.
One manifestation of this spill-over is the recent suggestion that the
military adopt Michigan's "Guilty But Mentally II"verdict. 23 ' To
address this suggestion it is necessary to analyze the Michigan system in light of the needs of the military. Upon analysis, this suggestion will be seen as a result of hostility and not need.
Under the guilty but mentally ill system, a defendant who
raises the mental nonresponsibility defense is faced with four possible verdicts. He may be found not guilty, guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty but mentally i. 2 32 The terms "insanity"
and "mentally ill" are not only defined differently, they carry different consequences.23 3 The term "insanity" refers to whether the defendant lacked substantial capacity to either appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. 234 A defendant found not guilty by reason of
insanity is theoretically free from blame and punishment.2 35
"Mentally ill," on the other hand, is defined as a "substantial
disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment,
behavior, capacity to recognize reality or ability to cope with the
ordinary demands of life. ' '2 36 A defendant found guilty but mentally ill is not free from blame and is to be sentenced as if he were
227. Teplin, The Criminalizationof the Mentally Ill Speculation in Search of Data in
63 (L. Teplin, ed. 1984).
228. Id. at 66.
229. Id. at 72.
230. Id. at 79.
231. Trant, The American Military Insanity Defense: A Moral, Philosophical, and
Legal Dilemma, 99 MIL.L. REV. 1, 86-112 (1983).
MENTAL HEALTH AND CRIMINAL JusTicE

232. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 768.29(2) (West 1982).
233. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 768.36 (West 1975).

234. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 768.21(a) (West 1970).
235. Only defendants found guilty but mentally ill are sent to prison. Mich. Comp.

Laws Ann. § 768.36 (West 1975).
236. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 330.1400(a) (West 1974).
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found guilty. 237 However, in addition to earning a prison sentence,
this defendant is earmarked to receive a psychiatric evaluation and
treatment, if the evaluation indicates that treatment is necessary.23 8
Whether the defendant receives treatment or not, he still must serve
239
his sentence just as if he were found guilty.

There are good reasons why the guilty but mentally ill system
is ill-suited to the military and therefore should not be adopted.
First, there is simply no need. The system grew out of the popular
misconception that the mental nonresponsibility defense was allowing dangerous defendants to go free.24 ° Yet, the statistics show
that the successful plea of mental nonresponsibility is a rare occurrence, both within and without the military. The National Mental
Health Association sets out the following observations:
Of 32,000 adult defendants represented by the Public Defenders
Office in New Jersey last year[1982], 52 insanity pleas were entered and 15 were successful.
Far less than 1 percent of the felony cases in Virginia involve the insanity defense, and the number of acquittals does not
exceed 15 per year.
In New York the defense is raised one in 600 to 700 criminal
cases; it is successful in 25 percent of these.
In Michigan over the past years, approximately 1,000 defendants per year have pled insanity; an average of 60 have
succeeded.241

Thus, even in the larger areas, such as New York, there is no evidence of any abuse of the mental nonresponsibility defense. The

evidence is equally persuasive in the military. With an average conviction rate of 94.5 percent, 24 2 it is extremely unlikely that the de237. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 768.36(3) (West 1975).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Smith & Hall, EvaluatingMichigan'sGuilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Empirical Study, 16 J. LAW REFORM 77 (Fall, 1982). Professor Slobogin reports that
twelve states have adopted some form of the GBMI system. Slobogin, supra note 159,
at 496 n.10. Of course, the most well-known impetus was John Hinkley's attempt on
President Ronald Reagan's life. Hinkley was later found not guilty by reason of insanity, supra note 220.
241. NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH AsSOCIATOIN, MYTHS AND REALITIES: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE at 15 (1983).
242. Out of 4,951 trials, the Army had 4,545 convictions. REPORT OF THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE ARMY, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CODE COMMITTEE

ON MILITARY JUSTICE 27 (1984).

12,061 convictions.

Out of 12,592 trials the Navy-Marine Corp had
in
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE 38 (1984). In the

REPORT OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY,

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CODE
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fense is creating a danger.
It is not by coincidence that the American Bar Association, the
American Psychiatric Association, and the National Mental Health
Association have all rejected the guilty but mentally ill system.2 43
It is a cynical approach to the problem of how society should treat
the defendant acquitted by reason of mental nonresponsibility. It
attempts to compromise in an area where there can be no compromise. This is so because it places blame, recognizes an excuse and
inflicts punishment all at once. z44 If the defendant's act was caused,
at least partially, by his illness, punishment will serve no purpose.
The next person whose ability to adhere to the law is impaired by
his illness will not be deterred by the prospect of punishment. If he
is to be deterred, then any mental illness that may exist is irrelevant
and can only prejudice the fact finder. Since the guilty but mentally
ill system assumes that the defendant's illness plays an insignificant
part in the commission of the crime, it is a needless extension of the
guilty verdict and its only effect will be to encourage the jury to
ignore the defendant's plea of nonresponsibility.
The closeness between the definition of "insanity" and "mental
illness" supports this prediction. The following definitions have
been suggested for the military:
INSANITY: Based upon the totality of his mental faculties, was
the time of his actions substantially unable to act
the accused2 4 at
5
rationally?
MENTAL ILLNESS: Based upon the totality of his mental facaction, was the accused's capacity to act
ulties at the time of2his
46
impaired?
rationally
The closeness will certainly not be missed by the finder of fact.
Therefore, whether defendant is acquitted by reason of mental nonresponsibility or found guilty but mentally ill will more likely turn
on the amount of fear which can be generated.
Air Force there were 1,471 trials and 1,369 convictions.

REPORT OF THE JUDGE

AD-

VOCATE GENERAL OF THE AIR FORCE, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CODE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE 49 (1984). The Coast Guard had 144 trials and 141

convictions. REPORT OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL OF THE UNITED STATES COAST
GUARD, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CODE COMMITTEE 55 (1984).
243. A.B.A. Standing Committee, supra note 23, at 318, NMHA Myths and Realities, supra note 242, at 32; Slobogin, supra note 159, at 496.,
244. The mental nonresponsibility defense "reflects society's unwillingness to impose
condemnation and punishment when it cannot impose blame." Bazelon, Canl Psychiatry
Humanize the Law, 7 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 29, 30 (1977).
245. Trant, supra note 16, at 111-12.
246. Id.
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Much more troublesome is the focus on "rationality." The
drafter explains that the term "rationality" avoids "quasi-legal,
moral, ethical terms" such as "criminality" and thereby allows experts to testify in medically relevant terms.24 7 Yet, this ignores the
nature of the nonresponsibility defense. To date, there are no medically relevant terms to determine when a defendant should be excused.24 8 One cannot erase moral considerations from what is
essentially a moral determination. Moreover, if experts are not confining their testimony to the medically relevant, i.e., a clinical diagnosis, it is because of a misunderstanding of the expert's role. 24 9 It
is not because of the present test of nonresponsibility. Further, the
term "rationality" is so amorphous and subjective that it cannot be
defined. If it cannot be defined how is one to know whether the
defendant acted in a particular manner?
Finally, an empirical study of Michigan's guilty but mentally
ill system concludes that instead of lessening the dangers of mistakes in outcome, the system is allowing more truly culpable defendants to escape guilty verdicts. 250 There has been no significant
247. Id.
248. See supra notes 78-86, and accompanying text.
249. Judge Mitchell, of the Navy-Marine Corp Court of Military Review has offered
an excellent and concise discussion of the expert's role and the problems which arise
when this role is misunderstood:
At the outset it is noted that the task of dealing with apparently conflicting
psychiatric and psychological experts is made simpler by a clear understanding of the difference between law and medicine. The law is not concerned with
the precise medical definition of insanity as is true of medicine. The physician's purpose of definition are to identify a medical problem (in this case a
psychiatric one) and to grade its medical significance, so it can be intelligently
discussed and treated. The psychiatrist uses terminology and processes which
are useful to that purpose. The law, on the other hand, in its substantive
provisions and the judgment of the trier of fact, is concerned with defining the
degree of mental impairment that will excuse crime. It is not surprising that
the lawyer and psychiatrist will often encounter a certain confusion as they try
to communicate across their differing perspectives, and as a result they often,
perhaps unwittingly, confuse their roles in trial. The lawyer must be aware
that there are infinite gradations of sanity, that psychiatry is not a precise
science and that psychiatric terminology does not have universal meaning.
The criminal law cannot realistically adjust to infinite gradations of human
mental weakness. . . . Consequently, there is a great necessity to avoid allowing the labels used by the medical experts to themselves be outcome determinative, since the same labels are often used differently by different
psychiatrists and are not by themselves relevant to the criminal law's purpose.
United States v. Kraus, 20 M.J. 741, 742-43 (N.M.C.M.R. 1985).
250. Smith & Hall, supra note 241, at 80. In Michigan and Illinois, the number of
acquittals by reason of nonresponsibility increased after adoption of the guilty but mentally ill verdict. Slobogin, supra note 159, at 507-08. In Alaska and Georgia, however,
the number slightly decreased. Id.

1987]

MILITARY MENTAL NONRESPONSIBILITY DEFENSE

decrease in the number of "insanity" acquittals.2" 5 ' If this trend
continues, the system should foster more of the hostility out of
which it arose.
The real hostility, however, should be directed at the lack of
care given to the mentally disordered offender. The military, in particular, has a serious problem in providing its members with long
The normal course is simply to disterm mental health care.
charge the mental health patients and perhaps notify the state or
local Veteran's Administration hospital. 5 3 However, there is a
conspicuous lack of follow-up procedures in the military. In other
contexts, a lack of follow-up procedures has been cited as a major
contributor to recidivism among mentally ill offenders.2 5 4 A recent
study tracked 44 mentally ill offenders over a two year period. 5
Eighty percent of the offenders had been charged with murder or
attempted murder. 6 All were acquitted by reason of insanity.2 57
The study showed that given adequate hospitalization and outpatient treatment, the amount of recidivism among mental health offenders could be drastically reduced. 5 8 The present rate of
recidivism ranges from 15 to 37 percent, an already relatively low
figure. 259 However, in the study group there was a recidivism rate
of less than five percent and these crimes were only shoplifting and
contempt of court. 26' Thus, it would be better to direct hostility
towards treatment and rehabilitation rather than punishment.
V.

CONCLUSION

Because of the nature of military life, both in peace and in war,
more pressures are placed on the individual. As a result, a higher
percentage of criminal behavior may be the result of mental illness.
251. Id.
252. "The military medical system has procedures for dealing with mentally ill accused, but not on a long term basis." Williams, supra note 223, at 14 n.32. The mentally ill soldier is usually discharged from the service. Carroll, supra note 81, at 221.
However, there is no requirement that state or local authorities be notified of the possible need for civil commitment. Id.
253. Id.
254. See id. Cavanaugh and Wasyliw, Treating The Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity
Outpatient: A Two-year Study, 13 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 407, 413

(1985).
255. Id. at 407, 410.
256. Id. at 407.
257. Id.

258. Id. at 413.
259. Id.

260. Id. at 411.
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Hence, the military criminal justice system will more often witness
the assertion of the nonresponsibility defense. Military, and civilian
practitioners as well, should insure the procedural and substantive
fairness of this defense.
The mental nonresponsibility defense is indeed very complex.
Procedural issues, such as the defendant's notice and discovery obligations should be continually monitored. The requirement that defendant submit to a psychiatric evaluation is one area in need of
revision. The present rule does not sufficiently protect the defendant's right against self-incrimination. Another aspect of the psychiatric evaluation in need of revision is the role of the expert. This
also applies at trial. The military rules should continue to follow
federal procedure and limit the expert's role to that of a provider of
scientific data.
The substantive rules, such as burden of proof should remain
as they are. Placing the burden on defendant carefully balances the
desire to retain the defense while also recognizing society's need to
protect itself. Forcing the prosecution to bear an unfair burden
only creates hostility.
The present high level of hostility towards the mental nonresponsibility defense should not be allowed to spill into the military.
The military is unique in its mission, therefore it should not engage
in knee-jerk reactions which follow notorious cases. Changes
should come, if at all, only after careful deliberation.

